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Abstract Ever since an “evolutionary” perspective on the economy has been
suggested, there have been differing, and partly incommensurable, views on
what specifically this means. By working out where the differences lie and what
motivates them, this paper identifies four major approaches to evolutionary
economics. The differences between them can be traced back to opposite
positions regarding the basic assumptions about reality and the proper con-
ceptualization of evolution. The same differences can also be found in evolu-
tionary game theory. Achievements of the major approaches to evolutionary
economics and their prospects for future research are assessed by means of a
peer survey.
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1 Introduction
The question of what is specific about an evolutionary approach to economics
has been discussed ever since the label “evolutionary” was introduced into
an economic context in the late 19th century. A commonly accepted answer
is still pending. Nevertheless, interest in applying evolutionary thought to
economics has increased in recent years. In their bibliometric analysis of the
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EconLit database, Silva and Teixeira (2006) find that the number of articles
published in economic journals using the term “evolutionary” as a keyword
grew roughly exponentially between 1986 and 2005. In 2005, such articles
were about 1% of all journal publications covered by EconLit in that year.
However, Silva and Teixeira also find that the increasing use of the term
does not correspond with anything like growing coherence in what it is sup-
posed to refer to. There is still no agreement about the specific features
associated with the label “evolutionary” in economic analysis, not to speak of a
commonly accepted paradigmatic “hard core” like, e.g., the equilibrium-cum-
optimization framework in canonical economic theory.
Under these conditions it seems desirable to reflect on the differences in
interpretations, topics, and methods in evolutionary economics and on their
reasons—not least in order to explore the chances for reconciling the different
positions. This is particularly warranted in view of some recent developments
in the field. On the one hand, there is an ongoing interest in the role played
by evolutionary biology and Darwinism in evolutionary economics (see, e.g.,
Nelson 1995; Foster 1997; Witt 1999; Laurent and Nightingale 2001; Knudsen
2002; Andersen 2004)—an interest driven by the search for a unified evo-
lutionary approach. On the other hand, there are signs of disintegration.
Evolutionary game theory, for instance, takes little notice of the research that
is more broadly associated with evolutionary economics and vice versa (see,
e.g., Samuelson 2002 on the one side and Nelson and Winter 2002 on the
other). An attempt will therefore be made in this paper to identify the main
sources of disagreement on what is meant by the label “evolutionary” in the
economic context. In this attempt, the prospects for, or the limits of, a unified
evolutionary approach should become apparent. Such a clarification should
also benefit the assessment of the new developments in the field.
Scientific approaches can differ in many respects. The most consequential
differences usually occur at three levels of scientific reasoning. These are the
ontological level (what basic assumptions are made about the structure of re-
ality), the heuristic level (how the problems are framed to induce hypotheses),
and the methodological level (what methods are used to express and verify
theories). A key to a better understanding of evolutionary economics, it will
be argued, is to distinguish between these three levels and the corresponding,
often only implicit, assumptions. What different authors consider special about
the evolutionary approach, for instance, is likely to depend on how they
conceptualize “evolution” in the economic context. This is a decision at the
heuristic level, i.e. about what concepts to use to frame problems and their
interpretations. A different issue is how the authors define the agenda of
evolutionary economics. Economic phenomena can be seen as forming an own
sphere of reality, e.g., a sphere of subjective likings and beliefs. The agenda
then differs from the one that results when economic activities are seen, e.g.,
in a Darwinian world view, that is, as an interaction with nature’s constraints
and contingent on the human genetic endowment. This is a decision at the
ontological level where the assumptions about the structure of reality shape
the perception of objects and disciplinary boundaries (see Dopfer 2005).
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In many neo-Schumpeterian contributions to evolutionary economics, met-
aphors based on analogies to the Darwinian theory of natural selection are
strongly endorsed at the heuristic level (i.e. as a means of conceptualizing
evolution in the economic domain). At the same time, the challenge of a
naturalistic, Darwinian world view on the economy is usually ignored, if not
rejected, at the ontological level. Conversely, authors like Veblen (1898),
Georgescu-Roegen (1971), Hayek (1988), and North (2005) who have adopted
a naturalistic approach to evolutionary economics—but differ widely in most
other respects—do not work with analogies to Darwinian concepts at the
heuristic level. In contrast, the new approach of Universal Darwinism advo-
cates just such a combination of a heuristic based on an abstract analogy to
Darwinian concepts and a naturalistic ontological position (Hodgson 2002;
Hodgson and Knudsen 2006). Evolutionary game theory basically ignores the
conceptual debates and controversies in evolutionary economics. Yet, as will
be explained, within evolutionary game theory the opinions are divided exactly
along the same lines.
Finally, there is a third, the methodological, level where controversial as-
sumptions can be made. Here, a truly enduring controversy relates to the
question of whether and how to account for the role of history in economic
theorizing. As will turn out, however, this question is much less controversial
in evolutionary economics, probably because, in all of its different interpreta-
tions, the historical contingency of evolutionary processes is clearly acknowl-
edged. Different positions at the methodological level therefore usually mean
that they suggest different methods for coming to grips with the historical
dimension. However, in most cases the choice of the method is determined
by the particularities of the problems investigated. Often the methods are
complementary rather than alternatives. The decisions at the methodological
level are therefore more a matter of pragmatics than principles and not the
reason for the differences in the views about what is specific about evolutionary
economics.
In this paper it will therefore be argued that differing interpretations of
evolutionary economics have their origin in the, often not explicitly stated,
divergent ontological and heuristic positions. To elaborate on this argument
in more detail, Section 2 digs more deeply into the controversies at each of the
different levels of scientific reasoning—the ontological, the heuristic, and the
methodological levels. Section 3 shows that, once the contrasting views about
the first two levels are recognized, these can be used to identify four different
approaches to evolutionary economics. These approaches also differ signifi-
cantly in the main research topics they focus on. Section 4 turns to evolutionary
game theory and argues that, although there is hardly any exchange with
evolutionary economics, evolutionary game theory is faced with exactly the
same kind of ontological and heuristic controversies. In Section 5 achievements
and prospects for future research in evolutionary economics are assessed in
relation to the different approaches. To provide a more representative picture,
the assessment is based on the results of a peer survey. Section 6 offers the
conclusions.
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2 Why ontology and heuristics matter and methodology matters less so
As mentioned in the introduction, the question of what is specific about evo-
lutionary economics has several facets that correspond to different levels of
scientific reasoning: the ontological, the heuristic, and the methodological
levels. By tracing the various interpretations of evolutionary economics back to
different assumptions made at these three levels, the causes of the controversy
become more transparent, and the difficulties in reconciling the diverging
views can be assessed better.
To start at the ontological level, i.e. at the basic assumption about the
structure of reality, one possible position is ontological monism. This means
to assume that both change in the economy and change in nature belong
to connected spheres of reality and are therefore potentially interdependent
processes. Such an ontological continuity assumption is favored by the adher-
ents of an ideal of the unity of the sciences (see Wilson 1998) and it involves
adopting a naturalistic perspective on the human sphere. As explained else-
where (Witt 2004), the ontological continuity hypothesis does not imply that
evolution in the economy and evolution in nature are similar or even identical.
The mechanisms by which the species have evolved in nature under natural
selection pressure, and are still evolving, have shaped the ground for, and still
influence the constraints of, man-made, cultural forms of evolution, including
the evolution of the human economy. But the mechanisms of man-made
evolution that have emerged on that ground differ substantially from those
of natural selection and descent. Human creativity, insight, social learning,
and imitative capacity have established mechanisms of a high-pace, intra-
generational adaptation (Vromen 2004).1
The implication of the ontological continuity assumption—that the econ-
omy and economic change are connected with a naturalistic substratum—
is an idea that is often neglected, ignored, or even explicitly rejected in favor
of a dualistic ontology. The latter treats economic and biological evolutionary
processes as belonging to different, disconnected, spheres of reality.2 As a
consequence, possible influences on economic evolution that result from its
historical embeddedness in evolution in nature—such as, e.g., the influences
of the human genetic endowment on economic behavior—are ignored. Since
1From the point of view of the continuity hypothesis, the relevance of the Darwinian theory
of evolution for explaining economic change is therefore that of a meta-theory. Not unlike in
evolutionary psychology (see Tooby and Cosmides 1992), it allows the genetic endowment, fixed
at times when early humans were under fierce selection pressure, to be reconstructed along with
the influence it still has on economic behavior today. Furthermore, on this basis, the conditions
under which economic evolution took off in the early human phylogeny can be reconstructed. A
comparison with the conditions of modern economies is not only conducive to taking a naturalistic
perspective on the latter, but it also helps to better grasp the historical path of the development,
see Witt (2003, Chap. 1) for a more detailed discussion.
2A dualistic ontology is often justified with reference to the Cartesian divide between the
Geisteswissenschaften (humanities)—to which economics is considered to belong—and the sci-
ences, see the discussion in Herrmann-Pillath (2001) and Dopfer and Potts (2004).
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these basic assumptions about reality cannot be subjected to a test, they are
sometimes classified as metaphysical. They are part of a researcher’s informal
world view and will therefore be dubbed her or his ‘ontological stance’.
The second level of controversy relates to the heuristic devices that guide
the framing of problems and thus the way in which one arrives at conjec-
tures and hypotheses in evolutionary economics. At this level, some authors
argue that the use of particular analytical tools and models borrowed from
evolutionary biology is the specific feature that distinguishes “evolutionary”
from canonical economics. Here, they find themselves in the company of other
social sciences where analogy constructions to biological selection models and
population dynamics similarly provide the heuristic basis for conceptualizing
evolution in the own domain. This may not be surprising in view of the fact
that the Darwinian theory of natural selection is widely considered to be the
prototype of an evolutionary theory today.
Supported by attempts at extending the Darwinian theory universally
beyond the domain of evolutionary biology (Dawkins 1983), three principles
of evolution have now become increasingly popular as a heuristic for evolu-
tionary theorizing: blind variation, selection, and retention (Campbell 1965).
These have been derived by abstract reduction of some key elements of the
Darwinian theory of natural selection, and have been applied to conceptu-
alizing the evolution of technology, science, language, human society, and
the economy (Ziman 2000; Hull 2001; Hashimoto 2006; Hallpike 1985, 1986;
Nelson 1995, respectively). The borrowing of these domain-specific abstrac-
tions by other disciplines means, of course, that they still rely on an analogy
construction, albeit an abstract one. Analogy constructions and metaphors are
frequently used heuristic devices in scientific work and can be very fruitful. The
problem is that there is always also a risk of being lead astray by biases in, and
incompleteness of, analogies. The analogy between classical mechanics and
utility and demand theory in canonical economics is a well known example (see
Mirowski 1989, Chap. 5). The analogy constructions in evolutionary economics
are no less problematic (see Vromen 2006; Witt and Cordes 2007).
There are other heuristic strategies for conceptualizing evolution inspired
not by analogies, but by a generic concept of evolution. Consider something
that evolves, be it the gene pool of a species, a language spoken in a human
community, the technology and institutions of an economy, or the set of
ideas produced by the human mind. Although such entities can change over
time in response to exogenous, unexplained forces (“shocks”), their genuinely
evolutionary feature is that they are capable of transforming themselves
endogenously over time. The ultimate cause of their endogenous change is
the capacity to create novelty. The way in which this happens varies greatly
across different domains. In the biological domain, for instance, the crucial
processes are genetic recombination and mutation. These are very different
from, say, the cultural processes by which new grammatical rules or new idioms
emerge in the evolution of a language. Both these cases differ, in turn, from the
invention of new production techniques or the emergence of new institutions
in an economy.
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In all these cases, the generic feature that transcends the disciplinary do-
mains is the endogenous emergence of novelty. Yet this is not all. While
novelty can be the trigger of qualitative change in the evolving entity, the actual
process of transformation also depends on whether and how the novelty cre-
ated disseminates and, by doing so, transforms the entity. The dissemination of
novelty—the twin concept that characterizes evolution generically—is usually
contingent on many factors and comes in many forms. Among them are multi-
level competitive diffusion processes, like natural selection in the biological
sphere, or successive adoption processes resulting from a non-selective imi-
tation behavior as is often the case in the dissemination of human thought,
practices, and artifacts. “Evolution” can thus be characterized generically—in
a way that is not domain-specific—as a process of self-transformation whose
basic elements are the endogenous generation of novelty and its contingent
dissemination (Witt 2003, Chap.1). The generic concepts of novelty emergence
and dissemination provide an overarching heuristic for interpreting problems
and inducing hypotheses in the evolutionary sciences.
Since one’s ontological stance is independent of the heuristic strategy one
can choose to conceptualize evolution in economics, using any one of the
two-by-two combinations—monism vs. dualism and generalized Darwinian
heuristic vs. generic evolutionary heuristic—is, in principle, possible. Indeed,
each of the four combinations is the basis for a different interpretation of
what is specific about evolutionary economics. These interpretations will be
discussed in more detail in the next section. Before doing this, however, the
discussion of the three levels of controversy needs to be completed with a short
digression into the problems at the methodological level. Here the controversy
revolves around the question of how to account for the fact that the evolution
of the economy at any particular point in time results in conditions and events
that are historically unique.
The controversy begins with Veblen who, in formulating his version of
evolutionary economics, took the methodological position of the German
Historical School (see Hodgson 2001, Chap. 1). The controversy thus has its
prelude in the Methodenstreit of the late 19th century. Here is not the place
to discuss that prelude. Suffice to say that Veblen’s partisanship is difficult
to understand, if one were to follow the popular caricature of the Historical
School’s position as an entirely descriptive, a-theoretic historicism that denies
the possibility of general hypotheses and deductive reasoning in economics.
There was indeed much emphasis put on working in the historical archives to
register and reproduce, in a very descriptive fashion, data about the economic
conditions prevailing under different institutional regimes in earlier times.
However, this was not meant to imply that theoretical reasoning was not
possible.
The Historical School can be seen as part of the post Enlightenment em-
piricism that was in vogue in the nineteenth century. In the sciences, this kind
of empiricism—determined to uncover what historical reality is, what fossil
remnants look like, and to record the findings—was characteristic of the
Naturalist movement associated with names like Humboldt, Lyell, Herschel,
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Wallace, and others (Yeo 1993). After traveling all around the world, re-
searchers filled books, journals, and session of scientific academies with reports
on their observations and discoveries.3 To understand nature meant primarily
grasping its enormous variety. Something analogous to the Naturalists’ attitude
seems to have appealed to Veblen, who wanted to extend the naturalistic per-
spective to economic evolution. Hence, his sympathy for a methodology that
set out primarily to reconstruct the historical habits, institutions, technologies,
etc. and the order in which they occurred over time.
Of course, if historical description were the only method to account for the
fact that, at any particular point in time, the state of nature or the economy
is historically unique, evolutionary biology would reduce to natural history,
and evolutionary economics to economic history. Yet this did not happen.
Theoretical speculations about the general causal relationships and mech-
anisms that manifest themselves in the historical record turned out to be
possible and fruitful. Darwin’s theory of natural selection, the laws of heredity,
and their more recent biophysical underpinnings are all general hypotheses
about how the historical record has come about. Similarly, the particular
economic conditions and events characteristic of a certain epoch may be
historically unique. But this is not necessarily the case for the way in which
they are generated and the patterns of transition between the states. It may
be conjectured that the mechanisms of change are of more general nature, so
that they produce recurrent features of change in economic history that can be
explained by general hypotheses.
The methodological challenge that the historical contingency of economic
phenomena poses leaves a variety of options to respond. These options are
realized in different contributions to evolutionary economics, independent
of their specific ontological and heuristic positions. Indeed, there seems to
be a tendency across all ontological and heuristic positions to accept that
different explanatory challenges require different methodological responses.
One way to respond is to construct historical narratives for observed changes
in technology and its knowledge base that identify, record, and make sense
of, the historical sequence of events. As the work of Mokyr (1998, 2000)
shows, qualitative theoretical inquiries into economic history like these can
be based on a heuristic of selection analogies and metaphors. On the same
basis, another methodological option is, for example, the development of
sophisticated quantitative survival models to explain the historical record of
the entry and exit dynamics over an industry’s life cycle (Klepper 1997).
A method of historical reconstruction that is compatible also with other
heuristic strategies is the “history-friendly, appreciative” modeling approach
(Malerba et al. 1999). It makes use of numerical models whose simulations
3In broader perspective, the historical contingency of empirical phenomena is by no means
exclusively a problem in economics. It is center stage in the great transition in the sciences from
the a-historic, Newtonian world view to an evolutionary one during the Darwinian revolution
(Moore 1979). It is worth noting that the ground for the transition was prepared by the Naturalists’
empiricism (Mayr 1991, Chap. 1).
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can be made to fit an observed sequence of historical events or empirical time
series. To match the general theoretical claims with the historical contingency
condition, the models can be used to simulate counter-factual sequences
of events (see Cowan and Foray 2002). Independent of the choice of the
heuristic strategy, a frequently adopted methodological approach is to focus
on the explanation of recurrent features of the evolutionary process rather
than its historically unique outcomes. This means theorizing, e.g., about some
underlying mechanisms of change or some typical transition patterns (assumed
to be involved in generating historically unique outcomes without themselves
being equally historically unique). A wide variety of modeling approaches is
based on this methodology: diffusion models describing technological change
as a result of innovativeness (Metcalfe 1988), selection models emulating
competitive industrial change (Metcalfe 1994), models of path-dependence,
lock-in, and critical masses in technological or institutional change (Arthur
1994; David 1993; Witt 1989). Last but not least, there is, of course, the option
to develop explanatory hypotheses on the historical process of evolution itself,
like, e.g., Hayek’s (1988) theory of societal evolution.
There is thus a large variety of very different methodological choices in evo-
lutionary economics (Cantner and Hanusch 2002). They can be, and in fact are,
employed in a pragmatic way to cope with the historical contingencies of evo-
lutionary processes. It may therefore be claimed that, at least in evolutionary
economics, the Methodenstreit has no longer any relevance as a source of
significant controversy. It is not at the methodological level, but at the onto-
logical and heuristic levels, that enduring controversies split the opinions in
evolutionary economics and trigger some of the new developments in the field.
3 A guide to evolutionary economics
In the previous section it was argued that the differences relating to ontological
stance and heuristic strategies are decisive for understanding the different
approaches to evolutionary economics. They can be conveniently represented
in a 2 × 2 matrix by depicting the two ontological positions against the two
heuristic strategies in Fig. 1. This representation provides a guide to both the
evolutionary heterodoxy and some new developments in this field. In view of
the great number and variety of contributions to evolutionary economics, no
attempt can, of course, be made here to discuss them in detail in the form of
a survey. The more limited purpose rather is to identify what the different,
overarching approaches are, and why they differ.
In the lower right cell in the matrix of Fig. 1, a dualistic, non-naturalistic
ontological perspective on economics is combined with a heuristic strategy
based on a generic concept of evolution. This is the position of Schumpeter
(1912) in his Theory of Economic Development. It is the basis for his unique
interpretation of economic development that is usually considered a seminal
contribution to evolutionary economics. Schumpeter did not use of the terms
“evolution” and “evolutionary” precisely because he wanted to avoid the
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Fig. 1 Interpretations of evolutionary economics
association with the monistic Darwinian interpretation that, in his mind, the
term evolution suggested.4 When he elaborated his theory, he was guided by
the notion that the economic transformation process is “intrinsically gener-
ated from within itself” (ibid. p. 75). As the source of change, he identified
entrepreneurial innovations. If successful, they disseminate through imitation
throughout the economy and thus transform its structure. This is exactly the
generic evolutionary heuristic that focuses on the endogenous emergence of
novelty and its dissemination.
However, Schumpeter did not fully exploit his ingenious insight. He used
the distinction between invention and innovation to belittle the role of novelty
creation (invention) and instead emphasized, in a voluntaristic fashion, the
heroic character of entrepreneurship that he deemed necessary in order to
be able to carry out innovations. Attention was thus shifted away from how
the new knowledge on which innovations are based is being created and
how the corresponding search and experimentation activities—the sources of
novelty—are motivated. Furthermore, Schumpeter’s theory was inspired not
least by the ongoing debate on the crisis-driven capitalist development and his
own experience of the uneven growth and wealth generating industrialization
process at the turn of the 19th century. This may explain why his theory of
4See Schumpeter (1912, Chap.7). The chapter was omitted from later editions and the English
translation of 1934. It has appeared only recently in English translation (Schumpeter 2002). In this
chapter, Schumpeter is quite explicit in criticizing the pure theory of economics of his time because
of its flawed Newtonian equilibrium heuristic. But he did not distance himself from the dualistic
ontological position of that theory.
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economic development is presented in terms of a theory about the unsteadi-
ness of capitalist development, i.e. a business cycle theory. Entrepreneurs who
trigger a wave of innovations and imitation occur “in swarms” and therefore
induce the economy to move through phases of “prosperity and depression” in
cyclical pattern.
At that time, explaining the business cycle was cutting edge research in eco-
nomics. In presenting his theory of economic development as a contribution to
the unfolding business cycle research, Schumpeter was able to earn himself a
reputation as leading theorist in economics. But this way of selling his theory
detracted attention from its non-Newtonian, evolutionary foundations. When
Schumpeter (1942) later modified important parts of his theory, the evolu-
tionary impetus was weakened even further. He claimed that, in the further
development of capitalism, the role of the promoter-entrepreneur would be
replaced by large, bureaucratic corporations and trusts (ibid., Chap. 7 and 12)
and, thus, omitted the original psychological, motivational foundations of his
entrepreneurial theory (that were difficult to reconcile with the equilibrium-
cum-optimization paradigm). What he emphasized instead were the concomi-
tants of the routine-like innovativeness of the large trusts: unprecedented
economic growth and productivity increases on the one side and monopolistic
practices necessary to protect the investments into innovations on the other.
By arguing that it is not possible to have the one without the other, he chal-
lenged the established ideal of perfect competition. This interpretation of the
competitive process—later dubbed the “Schumpeterian hypothesis”—stirred a
long debate with a huge number of empirical and theoretical contributions (see
Baldwin and Scott 1987). However, the broader, evolutionary connotations
were increasingly lost from sight.
The unique heuristic strategy developed in Schumpeter (1912) did not
find followers. None of Schumpeter’s prominent Harvard students carried it
further with, perhaps, the exception of Georgescu-Roegen (see below). A
resurgence of interest in Schumpeter’s pioneering evolutionary contribution
had to wait until the work of Nelson and Winter (1982) and their neo-
Schumpeterian synthesis. Yet this synthesis is based on a different heuristic
strategy. In the debate on “economic natural selection” in the 1950s, analogies
and metaphors relating to the theory of natural selection had made their
appearance as a possible heuristic strategy in economics.5 Nelson and Winter
introduce this heuristic that makes metaphorical use of Darwinian concepts
as a central element of their conceptualization of the transformation process
in firms and industries. They thus replace the generic evolutionary heuristic
that Schumpeter had used in avoiding Darwinian concepts. Indeed, within the
5Alchian (1950), Penrose (1952), Friedman (1953). The core of the debate was whether, in a
competitive market, a firm can survive if it is not profit maximizing—an attempt to employ the
selection metaphor to rectify profit maximizing behavior. However, on closer inspection, it turns
out that the profit level sufficient to ensure survival at a particular time, and in a particular market,
varies with so many factors that no unique profit maximum can be determined, see Winter (1964),
Metcalfe (2002).
What is specific about evolutionary economics? 557
neo-Schumpeterian camp, this switch to, and the reliance on, the Darwinian
selection metaphor are often considered to be the constitutive element of
evolutionary economics (e.g. in Dosi and Nelson 1994; Nelson 1995; Zollo and
Winter 2002). Schumpeter’s non-monistic ontological stance in defining the
disciplinary bounds of economics is factually maintained (see Nelson 2001).
The neo-Schumpeterian approach therefore represents the combination of the
upper right cell in Fig. 1.
In Nelson and Winter (1982), the heuristic based on Darwinian metaphors
is the inspiration for an idea that has become a core concept of the neo-
Schumpeterian approach: the organizational routine as a unit of selection in
economic contexts. Schumpeter (1942) did not back a crucial assumption of
his innovation competition hypothesis—that the corporate organizations of
the large trusts have taken over the innovation process in the economy—with
any specific hypotheses as to how these organizations do this. The concept of
the organizational routine fills the gap. This is derived from the behavioral
theory of the firm (March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963)—another
constitutive element of Nelson and Winter’s neo-Schumpeterian synthesis.
Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, Nelson and Winter (1982,
Chap. 5) argue that, in their internal interactions, firm organizations are
therefore bound to use rules of thumb and develop organizational routines.
Production, calculation, price setting, the allocation of R&D funds, etc. are all
represented as rule-bound behavior and organizational routines.
Informed by a heuristic based on the selection metaphor, Nelson and Winter
interpret organizational routines as sufficiently inert to function as the unit of
selection. Accordingly, the firms’ routines are taken as the analogue to the
genotypes in biology. The specific decisions resulting from the routines applied
are taken as the analogue to biological phenotypes. The latter are supposed
to affect the firms’ overall performance. Different routines and different
decisions lead to differences in the firms’ growth. On the assumption that
routines which successfully contribute to growth are not changed, the firms’
differential growth can be understood as increasing the relative frequency of
successful “genes-routines”. In contrast, routines that result in a deteriorating
performance are unlikely to multiply, so that their relative frequency in an
industry decreases.
There is no doubt that the re-formulation of Schumpeter’s conjectures on
innovativeness, industrial change, and growth in terms of selection processes
operating on the organizational underpinnings of firms and industries yields
important insights. Nelson and Winter demonstrate that the firms’ competitive
adaptations to changing market conditions do not necessarily have to be un-
derstood as a deliberate, optimizing choice between given alternatives. Rather
the adaptations may be forced on the industry by selection processes operating
on the diversity of routines used in that industry. At the same time, Nelson
and Winter are also able to account for the effects of innovative activities, the
breaking away from old routines, in an industry’s response to changing market
conditions. New ways of doing things result from search processes which
are themselves guided by higher level routines. Modeled as random draws
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from a distribution of productivity increments, innovations raise the average
performance of the industry and regenerate the diversity of firm behaviors.
Selection then drives out some of the firms, while the surviving ones tend to
grow. Under innovation competition, technology and industry structure thus
co-evolve and feed a non-equilibrating economic growth process.
Although the concept of the organizational routine, exposed to selection,
has now become something of an icon of the neo-Schumpeterian approach to
evolutionary economics, the perhaps even more momentous effect that Nelson
and Winter’s synthesis triggered was a different one. It prepared the ground for
taking advantage of the rich body of insights on knowledge creation (neglected
by Schumpeter) that in the meantime had become available in innovation
research (see Dosi 1988). Indeed, the blending of innovation studies with the
classical Schumpeterian themes of technological change, industrial dynamics,
and economic growth has generated thriving empirical research that, in many
cases, makes little, if any, use of the notion of routines and Darwinian
metaphors (see Fagerberg 2003 for a survey).
On the methodological side, Nelson and Winter (1982) strongly rely on a
simulation-based analysis of the implications of the selection processes oper-
ating on populations of firm routines—a methodology that has found many
followers in the neo-Schumpeterian camp (e.g., Andersen 1994; Malerba and
Orsenigo 1995; Kwasnicki 1996). As an analytically solvable alternative an
approach based on the replicator dynamics has been suggested by Metcalfe
(1994). It raises the heuristic of the selection metaphor to the level of a more
stringent analogy construction. Unlike the modeling tradition in economics
that focuses on the situational logic of (representative) individual behavior and
its motives, the replicator dynamics—an abstract model of natural selection—
focuses on the changing composition of populations and thus requires “pop-
ulation thinking”—a point much emphasized by Metcalfe.6 In this version,
the analogy-based heuristic then allows even the economic analogue of main
theorems of population genetics to be derived.7
6The flip side of the coin is that the assumption of selection operating on routines and population
thinking makes it difficult to account for individual learning, problem solving, and strategic
reorientation—as important as they may be for the firms’ adaptations to changing market
conditions. Focus is at the industry level. Improved average performance in the industry is
explained exclusively in terms of changing relative frequencies of the organizational routines that
are themselves unchanging.
7These are Fisher’s principle and Kimura’s theorem, see Metcalfe (2002). The former states that
natural selection raises average fitness in a population to the level of the highest individual
fitness, the pace of change of the mean population fitness being proportional to the variance
of the individual fitness. In the economic analogue, fitness is expressed by profit differentials
between competing firms. In population genetics, mutation and cross-over again increase variety
continuously. The analogue in economics, Metcalfe (1998) argues, is Schumpeter’s notion of the
creative (innovative) destruction. By improving products, technology, organizational routines, etc.
profit differentials are built up anew. Variety reducing and variety increasing processes taken
together establish the “capitalist engine of growth”.
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In the neo-Schumpeterian approach, a non-monistic ontological stance is
combined with a heuristic using Darwinian metaphors to conceptualize eco-
nomic evolution. However, such a heuristic strategy is also compatible with a
monistic ontological stance that suggests extending the naturalistic view of the
sciences to economic behavior and the economy. This is the combination in the
upper left cell in Fig. 1. It corresponds to the approach advocated by the propo-
nents of “Universal Darwinism” (Hodgson 2002; Hodgson and Knudsen 2006).
The characteristic of this approach is that it relies on an abstract analogy to,
rather than a metaphorical use of, Darwinian principles: Campbell’s (Campbell
1965) variation, selection, retention principles. As already mentioned in the
previous section, these have been derived by an abstract reduction of real
processes in evolutionary biology and are claimed to govern evolutionary
processes in all spheres of reality.
Regarding evolutionary processes in the economy, the latter claim has been
met with skepticism (see Nelson 2006). Some critics object to the inevitable
risks of being misled in economic theorizing by the domain specific abstractions
of Universal Darwinism (Buenstorf 2006; Cordes 2006). The reasons for
using a particular heuristic strategy have to do with expectations regarding
the fecundity of the strategy. The question will therefore be whether the
advocates of Universal Darwinism can dispel the concerns of their critics by
demonstrating the fruitfulness of their heuristic in the economic domain. Up
to now, not enough concrete research has been done in economics on the
basis of Universal Darwinism (see, however, Hodgson and Knudsen 2004). An
assessment of the pros and cons is therefore not yet possible.
Finally, the lower left cell in Fig. 1 represents the combination of a monistic
ontological stance and a heuristic strategy focusing on the emergence and
dissemination of novelty as generic concepts of evolution.8 The combination
is characteristic of a naturalistic interpretation of evolutionary economics that
has been advocated by several writers. Since they come from quite different
strands of thought, they are, however, often not recognized as following a
common approach, nor is their approach usually perceived as a coherent
alternative to the position of the neo-Schumpeterians. There are good reasons
to associate Veblen with this position (see Cordes 2007). The arguments by
which Veblen (1898) introduced the very notion of evolutionary economics
to the discipline clearly indicate that what he had in mind was a naturalistic
ontology, based on a Darwinian world view. His heuristic strategy is less
clear. He did not provide any generic characterization of evolution. But
he repeatedly emphasized human inventiveness and imitation as important
8Unlike Universal Darwinism, this position does not claim that the explanation of evolution
in nature and evolution in the economy can identically be reduced to the abstract Darwinian
principles of variation, selection, and retention. Instead, the latter are seen as special, and therefore
often not relevant, materializations of what drives evolution generically: the emergence and
dissemination of novelty. Consequently, for this position, the role which the Darwinian theory
plays is defined by the ontological continuity hypothesis, see footnote 1 above.
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drivers of the development of institutions and technology, just as the heuristic
strategy in the lower left cell in Fig. 1 would suggest.
An eminent contribution to evolutionary economics, that is very explicit
about taking this position, is the work of Georgescu-Roegen (1971). In line
with his ontological and heuristic position, major recurring themes in his
writings are the role of novelty in driving evolution and the role of entropy
in constraining evolution. Both issues are given a broad methodological and
conceptual discussion and are finally applied to reformulating economic pro-
duction theory. In reflecting on the conditions and the evolution of production,
he strongly conveys the gist of what has been called here the continuity hy-
pothesis. This is perhaps even more true of his inquiry into the technology and
institutions of peasant economies in contrast to modern industrial economies
(see Georgescu and Roegen 1976, Chapters 6 and 8). His concern with the
fact that natural resources represent finite stocks that are degraded by human
production activities induced him to criticize the abstract logic and subjective
value accounting of canonical production theories that tend to play down these
concerns.
A similar criticism also motivates works in the tradition of Georgescu-
Roegen’s naturalistic interpretation of evolutionary economics that link up
with the emerging ecological economics movement like Gowdy (1994) and
Faber and Proops (1998). Gowdy and Faber and Proops emphasize the role
of the emergence of novelty, and they focus in a naturalistic perspective
on production processes, their time structure, and their impact on natural
resources and the environment. Blending positive evolutionary theorizing with
normative environmental concerns, Gowdy and Faber and Proops also expand
on the policy implications focusing on core issues of ecological economics, thus
explicitly connecting the agenda of evolutionary and ecological economics.
Another eminent contribution that explicitly takes the naturalistic position,
albeit with an entirely different motivation and background, is the late works
of Hayek (1971, 1979, 1988, Chap. 1) on societal evolution. Hayek distin-
guishes between three different layers where human society evolves. A first
layer is that of biological evolution during human phylogeny where primitive
forms of social behavior, values, and attitudes became genetically fixed as a
result of selection processes. These imply an order of social interactions for
which sociobiology provides the explanatory model. (Once genetically fixed,
these attitudes and values continue to be part of the genetic endowment
of modern humans, even though biological selection pressure has now been
largely relaxed.) At the second layer of evolution, that of human reason,
evolution is driven by intention, understanding and human creativity resulting
in new knowledge and its diffusion. The crucial point of Hayek’s theory is,
however, that between these two layers of evolution, i.e. “between instinct
and reason” (Hayek 1971), there is a third layer of evolution. This is a layer
at which rules of conduct are learnt and passed on in cultural rather than
genetic transmission. The process is often not even consciously recognized.
Accordingly, the emergence of, and the changes in, the rules of conduct that
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shape human interactions and create the orderly forms of civilization are not
deliberately planned or controlled.
While these conjectures correspond to the ontological continuity hypothesis
discussed in Section 2, Hayek goes a step further by adding a group selection
hypothesis. Which rules are transmitted and maintained, he claims, depends on
whether, and to what extent, they contribute to a groups’ success in terms of
economic prosperity and population growth. The latter can be brought about
either as a result of successful procreation or through the attraction and inte-
gration of outsiders. A growing population fosters specialization and division
of labor, and this will be the more so the case, the more reliably a group’s
rules of conduct coordinate individual activities and prevent social dilemmas.
By the same logic, groups that do not adopt appropriate rules are likely
to decline. Hayek thus interprets cultural evolution as a differential growth
process operating on human sub-populations that are defined by their common
rules of conduct. The criterion of the process is the—not necessarily genetic—
reproductive success which the group’s rules enable. From his hypotheses
Hayek draws far-reaching conclusions regarding the political economy of the
“extended order of the markets” that he considers the main human cultural
achievement (see Hayek 1988).
It is worth noting that Hayek’s group selection hypothesis does not necessar-
ily involve natural selection operating at the level of the genes. It thus differs
from the “dual inheritance hypothesis” in anthropology (see Henrich 2004;
Richerson and Boyd 2005). The latter holds that gene-based natural selection
processes and cultural learning jointly developed an impact on reproductive
success in early phases of human phylogeny in which selection pressure was
high. In the dual inheritance model, the cultural learning component explains
why group selection is possible where natural selection alone would be bound
to kin selection.
Unlike both Hayek’s (tacit) cultural learning theory and the dual-
inheritance hypothesis, the theory of economic change recently put forward
by North (2005) emphasizes the role of human cognition. Culture, institutions,
and technology matter for economic evolution, not least through their influ-
ence on transaction costs as a measure of social efficiency. But the true driving
forces in North’s view are human intentionality, beliefs, insight (i.e. cognitive
learning), and knowledge. These make economic change for the most part a
deliberate process. Accordingly, North directs attention to what is learned and
how it is shared among the members of a society. The emphasis he puts on
human learning and knowledge creation—i.e. the emergence of novelty—and
the sharing of experience-based knowledge within and between generations—
i.e. dissemination of novelty—points to a heuristic similar to the one based
on the generic concept of evolution. Moreover, unlike his early contributions
to new institutional economics (see Vromen 1995), North (2005) clearly takes
a naturalistic ontological stance. Much like Hayek, he is eager to define the
relationship between his explanatory sketch of economic evolution and the
Darwinian world view, and the way he does so correlates with the ontological
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continuity hypotheses. Hence, North (2005) can be assessed as an important
recent contribution to the naturalist interpretation of evolutionary economics.
As the discussion has shown, the four combinations of ontological stances
and heuristic strategies in Fig. 1 correspond to four different interpretations
of what is specific about evolutionary economics. Of these interpretations,
the neo-Schumpeterian and the naturalistic interpretation have been those
most actively elaborated in recent times, the former clearly more so than the
latter. These two schools of thought differ significantly in the main research
topics they focus on. In a nutshell, the neo-Schumpeterian themes are inno-
vation, technology, R&D, organizational routines, industrial dynamics, com-
petition, growth, and the institutional basis of innovation and technology. The
themes of the naturalistic approach are long-term development, cultural and
institutional evolution, production, consumption, and economic growth and
sustainability.
The difference in perspective is not accidental. The naturalistic interpre-
tation offers substantial new insights, particularly in a comparative, long-
run analysis of the economic evolutionary process, while it makes less of a
difference, e.g., for economic theorizing on short run industrial dynamics and
competitiveness. However, this does not mean that the naturalistic approach
cannot fruitfully be extended to the neo-Schumpeterian agenda. For example,
production and consumption are important, but somewhat neglected, research
topics that are relevant also for the neo-Schumpeterian agenda. Integrating
the naturalistic approach with these topics can therefore be expected to add
significantly to the understanding of the structural transformation of industries,
economies, and international trade patterns.
4 Ontology and heuristics in evolutionary game theory
Many references in Hayek’s work on his theory of societal evolution show
that he draws to a considerable extent on the early sociobiology debate for
which the introduction of game-theoretic arguments played a constitutive
role (Caplan 1978). On the basis of a qualitative analysis, Hayek’s theory
of how societal evolution works therefore anticipates results that were later
established in a more rigorous form in the unfolding field of evolutionary
game theory in economics. In fact, his hypotheses on cultural learning at the
layer “between instinct and reason”, and the key role that rules of conduct
play for coordination and prevention of social dilemmas, can be reproduced
in elaborate game-theoretic terms (see, e.g., Witt 2008). In a sense, Hayek’s
contribution can thus be seen as an early outline of what a naturalistic
approach to evolutionary game theory could mean. With regard to ontological
stances and heuristic strategies, there is indeed a similar divide between
the different interpretations of evolutionary game theory in economics as
diagnosed in the previous section for evolutionary economics. Furthermore,
as in the case of evolutionary economics, the authors often do not seem aware
of the assumptions they implicitly make.
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Compared to rational game theory, the distinctive features of evolutionary
game theory are special assumptions about how strategies are determined
and, as a consequence, special solution concepts.9 These assumptions follow
from, and are designed to meet, the explanatory requirements of evolutionary
biology, particularly sociobiology (Trivers 1971; Wilson 1975; Maynard Smith
1982). With the rise of game theory as a major field of research in economics,
the interest of some authors was also attracted to evolutionary game theory.
This interest may sometimes be due more to the formal properties of evo-
lutionary game theory than to an intention to seek applications to economic
problems (see, e.g., Weibull 1995). Because of the special assumption built into
evolutionary game theory, such applications are indeed not easy to find (Fried-
man 1998). These assumptions make sense in sociobiology when arguing how
certain forms of genetically determined social behavior, e.g. altruistic forms,
can emerge under natural selection. It is not evident, however, what kind of
economic behavior is supposed to meet the assumptions of evolutionary game
theory.
Applications of evolutionary game theory in the economic domain follow
basically two interpretations. A first interpretation takes over models of
interactive selection mechanism and the corresponding algorithms from evo-
lutionary biology in order to model human interactive learning processes in an
economic context (usually non-cognitive learning behavior like reinforcement
or stimulus-response learning, see Brenner 1999, Chap. 6). This is not meant
to claim that the biological mechanisms apply directly to economic behavior—
an idea that would not make sense because human learning is a non-genetic
adaptation process. The interpretation is rather based on the heuristic strategy
of assuming an analogy between genetic adaptation mechanisms and the non-
genetic adaptation through non-cognitive learning. The formal background for
the analogy is replicator dynamics that covers a very broad class of adjustment
process (see Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988; Joosten 2006). In ontological terms,
i.e. with respect to the basic assumptions about the structure of reality, the
analogy construction typically neglects the question of whether, and how, eco-
nomic processes modeled in that way connect with the naturalistic foundation
of human behavior. This combination is thus the same as the one in the upper
right cell in Fig. 1.
For the second interpretation of evolutionary game theory, by contrast,
the biological context for which evolutionary game theory was originally
developed is directly relevant to the political economy applications this inter-
pretation deals with. It is claimed that certain very basic features of human
economic behavior, like altruism, moral behavior, fairness, and other rules of
conduct, have a genetic background and can therefore be best explained as a
9A player does not choose among strategies, but rather represents one fixed strategy out of a
set of strategies present in a population of potentially interacting players. Players (or strategies)
are matched randomly for single interactions. Their pay-offs are defined in terms of fitness values.
Differences between the players’ pay-offs result in a corresponding marginal change of the relative
frequencies of the respective strategies in the population. See, e.g., Friedman (1998).
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result of natural selection (see, e.g., Güth and Yaari 1992; Binmore 1998; Gintis
2007). Similar to the continuity hypothesis, the existence of such features of
human behavior is traced back to their conjectured emergence at the times of
early human phylogeny when natural selection pressure on the human species
was still high enough to shape behavior according to what can be speculated to
have raised genetic fitness. Unlike in the former interpretation, such a view
obviously presumes a monistic, naturalistic ontology. The heuristic strategy
is not explicitly dealt with, but it has some similarity with Hayek’s theory
of societal evolution. In Binmore (1998) the game-theoretic argumentation is
used to establish the particular content, e.g. in terms of the notion of fairness
and justice, of the rules of conduct that emerged initially in human phylogeny.
Because of its genetic background, the content is still effective and is argued to
imply two basic coordination mechanisms for human societies, leadership and
fairness (see also Binmore 2001).
In view of the two interpretations, it is striking how similar the understand-
ing of the specific meaning of the attribute “evolutionary” is in evolutionary
game theory and evolutionary economics. They share similar ontological
stances and heuristic strategies and even develop a similar schism in these
respects. But researchers in these two fields take little notice of each other.
There is hardly any cross reference between the two fields, even when scholars
from both camps join in symposia or conferences.10 In a rare attempt to
explain the mutual lack of exchange, Nelson (2001) argues that evolutionary
game theory differs in two ways from evolutionary economics. First, it is more
equilibrium oriented—even when the adjustment dynamics are explored this
mainly serves the understanding of the resulting equilibrium configurations.
Second, evolutionary game theory is less empirically oriented, paying little
tribute to analyzing the historical record of the evolutionary process. For these
reasons, Nelson argues, the two research communities have less in common
than might be expect. In a similar vein, Dosi and Winter (2002) argue that evo-
lutionary game theory is mostly theory-driven while evolutionary economics is
more experience-driven, leaving little common ground for exchange.
In the light of the present discussion, a distinction can, however, be made
between the naturalistic and the non-naturalistic approaches to evolutionary
game theory on the one side and to evolutionary economics on the other.
The non-naturalistic approaches do not have much more in common than the
construction of analogies to natural selection—in the one case with, in the
other without, strategic interaction—by means of concepts imported from
evolutionary biology. In such a situation, there seems to be little opportunity to
gain from trade. The naturalistic approaches, in contrast, share the explanation
of human economic behavior by recourse to genetic and behavioral dispo-
sitions. This creates much more commonality in substance (as, e.g., the line
of thought reaching from Hayek’s theory of societal evolution to Binmore’s
10See, e.g., the papers in Nicita and Pagano (2001) or the Journal of Economic Perspectives
symposium on evolutionary economics (Samuelson 2002; Nelson and Winter 2002).
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theory of social contract may show). Factual lack of exchange may here
simply be due to the small number of researchers who follow, at one time,
a naturalistic approach in their own field.
5 Recent trends in the evolutionary agenda—a peer survey
It has been argued above that Schumpeter’s original interpretation has no
more followers today and that Universal Darwinism is only just starting
substantial work in economics. Of the four different interpretations of evo-
lutionary economics in Table 1 only two—the neo-Schumpeterian and the
naturalistic—are therefore currently leading to significant research output.
These two differ significantly in the topics they deal with. If there were only the
diverging research interests, the two schools could be seen as complementary.
However, there is also a difference between the two in the basic assumption
they make about reality and the way in which they approach, and theorize
about, evolutionary processes in the economy. This is not easily reconcilable.
In this section, an attempt will be made to assess the achievements and
prospects for future research in evolutionary economics in relation to these
two main interpretations.
In order to put this assessment on a broader basis, this section draws on
the results of a survey conducted in 2004. A questionnaire in which they were
asked about their opinion was sent out by e-mail to 149 academic scholars
all over the world. The scholars were selected according to the criterion of
whether they had at least one publication where they had dealt with, and
had explicitly used the term, evolutionary economics.11 The questionnaire
contained several questions.
The first question aimed at getting an assessment from the respondents
about what has been accomplished by past research into evolutionary eco-
nomics. The precise formulation was: “Summarizing evolutionary economics’
achievements, what would you consider the most significant insights that have
so far been gained? (Please give 4 or 5 keywords or names of contributors.)”
In order to derive a survey statistic from the answers, the keywords quoted
in the questionnaires returned were categorized into classes of synonyms and
near-synonyms that were given a representative label, and the number of des-
ignations that fell into the various keyword classes were counted. The keyword
class then had to be identified, if possible, with one of the interpretations of
evolutionary economics in Fig. 1, an identification that was done according to
the author’s best knowledge. In view of the fate of Schumpeter’s position, and
11Although this is an objective selection criterion, it cannot be claimed that the selection of
scholars is free from subjective biases and that it forms a representative sample of all authors
who satisfy the criterion. Furthermore, the lack of anonymity in the e-mail based response mode
may have had an impact on who was willing to respond and in what way. The survey results may
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because of the early stage in which Universal Darwinism currently is, the neo-
Schumpeterian interpretation and that of the naturalist approaches are most
likely the research programs to be associated here.
Of the 149 questionnaires sent out, 53 (36%) were returned.12 Since some
of the keywords given in the questionnaires could not be associated with any,
or only very few, other keywords, a relatively large number of 48 different
keyword classes resulted. For space reasons, only the 16 keyword classes with
at least five designations—i.e. keywords quoted by at least roughly one tenth
of all respondents—are reported in Table 1 together with the percentage of
the 53 respondents that quoted the (near-) synonyms. The table also ranks
the number of designations of the keyword classes differentiated by the
professional status of the respondents. Furthermore, in the last column of
Table 1, the keyword classes are associated with one of the interpretations of
evolutionary economics.
For characterizing the achievements of evolutionary economics, the two
keyword classes quoted most often in the sample were: “innovations and
endogenous technological change” and “evolution of institutions and norms”.
With only one fourth of all respondents mentioning these keyword classes—
and even smaller shares mentioning other classes—there is only modest
agreement as to what the most significant insights in evolutionary economics
are. Furthermore, the differences between professors and younger scholars in
what they assess as an achievement or an insight in evolutionary economics
are striking. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the two rank
orders in Table 1 is very small (rs = 0.051), indicating that there is almost
no correlation between them. Given that the class label “innovations and
endogenous technological change” seems highly significant for the dominant
neo-Schumpeterian agenda, a share of only 26% may be surprising. Yet, in
view of the fact that 6 of the 16 class labels can also be identified with the
neo-Schumpeterian research agenda, this agenda is not under-represented. On
the contrary, if the identification in Table 1 of the keyword classes with the
alternative research programs is accepted, the neo-Schumpeterian school is
obviously perceived by the respondents as the most important and successful.
As indicated, seven of the remaining keyword classes can be claimed for both
research programs, two seem unclear, and only one—“spontaneous order”—
can, with some right, be considered associated with the naturalistic program.13
12By geographical status came 43 from Europeans and 10 non-Europeans. By professional status,
37 respondents were professors and 16 were at an earlier stage of their career (post-docs, lecturers,
researchers, etc.—because of their average age denoted “younger scholars” below).
13The keyword class “evolution of institutions and norms” demonstrates the difficulties involved
in the identification task. It can be identified with Veblen’s institutionalist agenda, with Hayek’s
and North’s agenda, and with that of evolutionary game theory (evolutionary game theory
itself was only among the less frequently (9%) mentioned achievements)—mostly naturalistic
interpretations. However, the keyword class could also be claimed to be significant for the
institutional underpinnings of national innovation systems, a neo-Schumpeterian theme.
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A second issue addressed by the questionnaire concerned the opinions
about promising topics for future research in evolutionary economics. The
precise formulation of the question was: “What would you consider the most
promising new developments in evolutionary economics since 1990? (Please
give 4 or 5 keywords or names of contributors.)” Again, the procedure was
to form classes of keywords from synonyms and near synonyms and to check
how far they are associated with any of the two schools. For this question, 44
different keyword classes resulted of which 13 obtained at least five designa-
tions. These are presented in Table 2, together again with the percentage of
the respondents, the ranks of the number of designations differentiated by the
professional status of the respondents, and the associations with the research
agendas of the different schools in evolutionary economics.
To characterize the most promising new developments, the keyword class
“integrating the institutional side” was quoted most often in the sample. This is
a conceptual issue that presently figures prominently in the neo-Schumpeterian
camp (see, e.g., Nelson and Sampat 2001) that has up to now been strongly
technology-oriented. Second in designation frequency are “agent-based mod-
eling tools and computational methods” and “cognitive aspects” (of the evolu-
tionary approach to economics)—the former a methodological/technical point
that is not specific to any of the two schools, the latter again a conceptual
issue relevant to both schools. The keyword label “industry evolution and life
cycles” that is next in relative frequency already appeared in Table 1 as major
insight and is therefore in italics. The same holds for “knowledge creation and
use” and “evolutionary game theory”. Unlike the other ten keyword classes
that signal a certain shift in interest or emphasis when turning from the past
to the future, the keywords in italics seem to be considered as topics with
continuing high potential.
As far as the identification with the two schools is concerned, the neo-
Schumpeterian themes are represented somewhat less than before, but the
naturalists’ topics have not gained more support. What does seem to be gaining
ground is the interest in formal modeling and the corresponding tools (“agent-
based and computational methods”, “network models”, “complex economic
dynamics”). The differences between professors and younger scholars in what
they consider promising new developments in evolutionary economics are
once again remarkable, albeit less spectacular than in Table 1. (For the two
rank orders in Table 2, rs = 0.345, at a significance level 0.248).
The results of the peer survey show that, of the two main interpretations of
evolutionary economics, the neo-Schumpeterian approach is perceived more
prominently and its achievements are more widely appreciated than is the case
for the naturalistic interpretation. This is not surprising in view of the fact
that these days, the majority of research activities in evolutionary economics
focus on innovations, technology, R&D, organizational routines, industrial
dynamics, competition, growth, and the institutional basis of innovations and
technology. These topics reflect the strong impact that Nelson and Winter
(1982) and their neo-Schumpeterian synthesis had, and still have, on the
field and on the self-perception of many scholars contributing to evolution-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































ary economics today. If judged by the survey results, the contributions to
the naturalistic interpretation—from Veblen (the inventor of “evolutionary”
economics) to Georgescu-Roegen, Hayek, North, and others—do not seem to
have much resonance in evolutionary economics today.
Regarding the promising prospects for future research, the situation is less
one-sided. In part this is due, however, to the stronger influence of formal
methods. These attract the interest particularly of the younger participants in
the survey, and they have no particular association with any of the alternative
interpretations. There are no signs of convergence as far as the two main
interpretations of evolutionary economics are concerned. The potential of the
naturalistic interpretation is still not really recognized by the evolutionary
economists. Its characteristic topics—long-term development, cultural and
institutional evolution, production, consumption, and economic growth and
sustainability—deserve more attention. They can help to avoid the impression
one can get today that evolutionary economics is basically a competitor to
canonical industrial economics. By embracing a wider range of topics, among
them traditional themes since the classics, the naturalistic agenda broadens
the scope of evolutionary economics. What is more, with its foundations in a
Darwinian world view, it can also challenge canonical economics and its mix
of Newtonian thought and radical subjectivism.
6 Conclusions
There is little agreement among the researchers in the field when it comes to
deciding what is specific about evolutionary economics. As has been shown
in this paper, some interpretations of evolutionary economics consider the
Darwinian theory of evolution relevant for understanding economic behavior
and the transformation of economic institutions and technology. Other inter-
pretations do not embrace, or even explicitly reject, that idea. At the core, this
is a controversy about the basic (ontological) assumption about the structure
of reality. It relates to the question of whether evolutionary change in nature
and in the economy represent connected spheres of reality, making them likely
to mutually influence each other.
In a different sense, the role of Darwinian theory is also relevant for a
second controversy. This revolves around the question of whether evolution-
ary theorizing in economics can profit from borrowing analytical tools from
evolutionary biology, e.g. models of selection processes and population dy-
namics. As has been explained, some authors consider the application of such
models to economic processes on the basis of analogies or metaphors to be
the specific feature of the evolutionary approach to economics. Other authors
have different ideas. To construct analogies between, and to use metaphors
originating from, different disciplinary domains is a heuristic device, i.e. a
way of framing problems and of arriving at hypotheses. Unlike the previous
controversy, the one about whether or not to borrow analytical tools from
evolutionary biology thus refers to the heuristic level. The way it is decided
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is independent of the ontological position taken, but is decisive for the form of
theorizing in evolutionary economics.
Finally, there is a controversy relating to the methodological level, particu-
larly to the problem that economic evolution is a historical process producing
historically unique conditions and events: how should this fact be accounted for
in evolutionary economics? The controversy has been claimed to be indepen-
dent of the other two. As was discussed in the paper, some authors have tried
to account for the question by relying on qualitative reasoning. Others have
responded by developing a “history friendly” modeling strategy. However,
it can also be argued that, while at any given time the results of evolution
may be historically unique, the processes by which they are generated are
not necessarily historically unique. (In fact, if this were not so, it would be
pointless to claim that the way in which evolution works can be explained by
more general hypotheses.) It can therefore be concluded that with the variety
of choices, and the usually pragmatic decision making as to which of them
to select, the methodological level is not the reason for the views on what is
specific about evolutionary economics being different.
The major differences indeed result from diverging ontological stances and
heuristic strategies. This turned out to be true also for evolutionary game
theory which is faced with exactly the same kind of ontological and heuristic
controversies. Juxtaposing the two positions that have been identified at each
of the two levels results in a convenient two-by-two matrix. In the paper this
matrix has served as a guide to the various interpretations of evolutionary
economics that can be found in the literature. Not all interpretations cor-
responding to the four cells in the matrix have received equal attention. In
recent years, the combination of Darwinian concepts at the heuristic level
and neglect or rejection of a naturalistic monism at the ontological level is
most frequent. This combination is characteristic of the neo-Schumpeterian
approach. As was shown, this has not always been so. Schumpeter’s own
approach differed from that of the neo-Schumpeterian. There has also been
a naturalistic interpretation of evolutionary economics advocated by such
diverse scholars as Veblen, Georgescu-Roegen, Hayek, and North. The most
recent development—Universal Darwinism—has been recommended as an
approach to evolutionary economics that favors yet another combination of
ontological stance and heuristic strategy.
The scientific value of the alternatives should be measured in terms of the
insights they deliver on the transformation processes in the economy. To assess
the fruitfulness of the alternative interpretations, a peer survey was conducted
to identify achievements in past research and promises for future research in
evolutionary economics. In the overall ranking of past achievements expressed
in the opinion poll, the neo-Schumpeterian position was found to stand out. In
the assessment of promising future research the picture is somewhat different.
However, there is little evidence for convergence, or for a real resurgence
of interest in the naturalistic approach to evolutionary economics. Such a
resurgence would seem desirable in order to broaden the agenda of evolution-
ary economics beyond the neo-Schumpeterian themes that basically rival the
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canonical theories of industrial economics and technological change. Not only
would topics like long-term development, cultural and institutional evolution,
production, consumption, and economic growth and sustainability have a
come-back on the evolutionary agenda. Founded on a Darwinian (naturalistic)
world view, evolutionary economics would also challenge in principle terms the
mix of Newtonian thought and radical subjectivism characteristic of canonical
economics.
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